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Abstract – This paper presents a conceptual analysis of terms belonging to the semantic field of state 
restructuring. The analysis aims to critically reviewing different terms focusing the attention both to 
the definitional and to the measurement sides. Different “types of decentralisation” are separately 
presented before reviewing a generalised approach aiming both at conceptualising and 
operationalising “regional authority” inside the internal structure of the state. In the final part the 
discourse is further generalised in order to take into account also external actors linking the analysis 
with the analytical framework of globalisation. The analysis confirms the persistence of a strong 
potential for confusion generating from the multitude of meanings attached to the term 
“decentralisation” and its related terms. However, having assembled terms together contributes to 
clarify and to interpret them more critically and in a more focused way. Moreover, the attention paid 
to the measurement side of the issue contributes also critically to interpret empirical analyses already 
realised in literature and, in perspective, could be a promising starting point for more focused future 
research.      
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1. Introduction 
Beginning from the 1970s increasing pressures towards a “state-rescaling” process – 
generally characterised by a transfer of power and resources from central to lower levels of 
government but also to external actors - have been registered as global trend linked to 
globalization (Jessop, 2002; Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2005; Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 
2009) and to the neoliberal argument that a rescaled state will reduce the state’s intervention 
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and unleash market forces
1
 (Jessop, 2002; Lobao and Hooks, 2003; Brenner, 2004; Harvey, 
2005). 
In order to interpret and (to some extent) steer this process since 1950s a vast body of 
literature has been developed by academic and practitioners drawing on different fields of 
social science  - economics (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1999, 2006)), politics (Loughlin, 2001; 
Keating et al., 2009), geography (Jones et al., 2005), sociology, history, anthropology, and, 
planning (Houghton, 2005) - often conflating the analysis with other issues such as 
democracy (Drèze and Sen, 2002) and market reforms or markestisation (Lobao et al., 2009). 
 
This multidisciplinary interest in this rescaling process aiming to analyse its 
determinants and its link to state’s outcomes (primarily) measured in terms of growth, 
inequality, and political stability led to a deeper understanding of this multifaceted 
phenomenon. However, the stratification of researches belonging to different traditions raises 
also several methodological issues
2
 (Cohen and Peterson, 1996). To the case at hand, the 
variety of approaches followed across different studies contributed to “attach a startling 
diversity of definitions and measures to the decentralisation concept [so that] there is little 
agreement about what constitutes an example of decentralization, what causes 
decentralization, or what effects it is likely to have” (Schneider, 2003, p. 32 and 33).    
 
The effects of this proliferation of definitions and measures are ex ante unclear. On 
the one hand, it could be intended as a resource in order to better take into account a different 
forms, varieties or variegation of decentralisation from different perspectives both 
conceptually and empirically. On the other hand, there is the risk that, as a result of the lack 
of a (clear) and shared definition, analyses become less precise, difficult to compare each 
other, and, in turn, less effective. Put differently, it could be said that in the case of 
decentralisation, in Lakoff (1987)’s terms, it is not clear whether a problem of under-
specification or over-specification arises.  
 
Not only different meanings have been attributed to “decentralisation” 
(administrative, fiscal, political, spatial), but also many different terms are often used in order 
to refer to changes involving the balance of power and competencies between central 
government and other actors both at sub-national and supra-national level often generating 
conceptual confusion. Hand in hand with research progress in this field a set of “de-terms“ 
(or related as federalism and regionalism) came into the limelight: deconcentration, 
delegation, denationalisation, destatisation, and, devolution.         
 
This circumstance makes it worth developing a conceptual analysis on different terms 
utilised across studies aiming to highlight differences between them at the same time as 
explicitly reconstruct their common denominator. A related issue not yet explicitly well 
                                                 
1
 Forms of decentralisation closely linked to market arguments are marketisation, and spatial decentralisation 
where the former refers to the process by which the supply side and the demand side are made closer in order to 
capture individuals’ preferences. This process is linked to recent trends toward economic liberalization, 
privatization, and the demise of command economies. While the latter refers to regional planning policies 
aiming at reducing excessive urban concentration in a few large cities by promoting regional growth poles that 
have potential to become centres of manufacturing and agricultural marketing.  
 
2
 According to the Authors in addition to careless use of conceptual definitions, these include misconceptions 
and unrealistic expectations, unsystematic presentations, an overemphasis on cases of failure, lack of 
comparability among diverse case studies, neglect of historical patterns that generate complexity, inappropriate 
linear assumptions, and ideological arguments that bureaucracies should be dramatically reduced and power and 
responsibility for public sector tasks be transferred to local communities, private sector firms, and organizations. 
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considered, despite its importance in terms of (re)interpretation of results already obtained in 
the literature, concerns how different concepts are translated into empirical analysis.  In 
Brenner’s words there is the need for  
greater attention to question of method - specifically to the mediation linking abstract concepts to concrete, 
contextually specific investigation. Careful exploration of such mediations could facilitate analytically robust, 
intellectually challenging lines of concrete research, which might then be mobilized as a basis for refining 
and/or critically re-evaluating some of the literature’s core theoretical categories, arguments and generalizations 
(2009, p. 123). 
Bearing these issues in mind, in what follows, a brief review of different terms related 
to state rescaling is presented aiming at filling the conceptual gap between studies developed 
from different perspectives by proposing a synoptic view of meanings developed over them. 
In particular, this paper performs a conceptual analysis of terms related to this restructuring 
process highlighting that, despite their “startling diversity” (Schneider, 2003), the crucial 
common point of different terms concerns the balance of power, responsibilities, and 
competencies between the central state and other entities. This circumstance justifies the 
research toward a common analytical framework for considering these terms, while 
differences between terms could be traced in directions, degree, and/or type, extent, and 
nature of attributions involved. 
Given the empirical attention devoted to the issue of spatial transformation of the state 
and its effects, the conceptual analysis is linked, for each term, with the critical consideration 
of additional issue concerning how concepts have been translated into empirical analysis (i.e. 
measurement issue).  
The paper is organised as follows. Sections 2 presents different types of 
decentralisation considering them separately. Section 3 focuses on three types of 
administrative decentralisation: deconcentration, delegation, and devolution. Section 4 deals 
with the related term “federalism”. Section 5 proposes a generalised approach based on 
“regional authority”. Section 6 shifts the attention to the international perspective of state 
restructuring process. Section 7 develops some concluding remarks.   
2. Decentralisation 
 
Decentralisation is a rather elusive term affected by a generalised confusion about its 
meaning which is subject to change according to different perspectives of analysis. Although 
there is  persistent confusion, a general agreement is achieved about its negative definition. In 
other words, it is well known what is not decentralisation but there is no agreement on what it 
actually is. Indeed, “most would agree that transferring power and resources to national 
governments is not decentralisation” (Schneider, 2003, p. 33). Moving from this last point, a 
shared positive element of decentralisation focuses on the transfer of power and resources 
away from the central government.    
 
Indeed, in public planning, management and decision-making it is defined as “the 
transfer of authority and power from higher to lower levels of government or from national to 
subnational levels” (Rondinelli et al., 1984; Collins and Green, 1994; Mills, 1994).  
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Therefore, it is worth stressing that decentralization and centralization represent two 
ends of a single continuum so that it is possible focusing on institutions receiving power or 
resources or, by contrast, on power and resources that are taken away from central 
governments (Schneider, 1993). A peculiar feature that is also worth stressing is that 
decentralisation refers to a transfer of power that happens in a political-administrative and 
territorial hierarchy in the sense that decentralized authorities are upwardly accountable to central 
government (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999, Crook and Manor, 1998). In Sherwood (1969)’s terms, 
decentralisation (as opposed to devolution) involve the creation of units of governance under the 
direct control of central authority. At the macro-level of analysis, should be noted that 
decentralization has both a state and a process dimension. The latter refers to a dynamic 
consideration of the phenomenon in order to analyse its evolution over time (consider, for 
example, the recent work of Karanikolas and Hatzipanteli (2010) with respect to rural 
development policy in Greece). Intended as a state (i.e. at a fixed point according to a time 
dimension) decentralisation can be analysed focusing both on level and degree. Referring to 
the former, decentralization may occur at system as a whole or at the organizational level.  It 
is said that it happens at the organisational level – and not in the system as a whole - when it 
involves the distribution of power over the decision-making process inside a single 
organisation (Mintzberg, 1979). Figure 1 aims at synthesise macro-categories presented 
above. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
 With particular regard to degree, moving also from the assumption that 
“decentralization is not an end in itself but rather should be designed and evaluated for its 
ability to achieve broader objectives of […] equity, efficiency, quality and financial 
soundness” (Bossert, 1998, p.1513), it is easy to recognise that in order to analyse and 
compare different experiences of decentralisation a crucial point is represented by the 
empirical representation of it. 
  
 The empirical representation (or measurement), in turn, is also clearly linked to the 
process side of the phenomenon since repeated measurement over time could return a crude 
measure of its evolution. Nevertheless, decentralisation, in its broader sense is impossible to 
measure according to a single – simple - metric, and, in turn, decentralisation as a whole risks 
having no significant explanatory power. Indeed, from its nature of complex multilevel 
phenomenon concerning several administrative, fiscal, and political dimensions, arise the 
difficulty to adopt analytic criteria able to capture all dimensions in a single metric able to 
quantify concepts as autonomy, accountability, power, and responsibility. 
 
 For example, widespread measures of decentralisation have been developed on fiscal 
basis. Nevertheless, as discussed before, those types of fiscal measures could be misleading 
measures of power and authority for several reasons. 
  
 Therefore, rather than measuring decentralisation scholars refer to dimensions of it 
(Schneider, 2003). In other words, what is needed our approaches allow us to disaggregate 
the dimensions over which local authorities have a defined range of power, avoiding seeing 
decentralization as a single transfer of a block of authority and responsibility. 
 
Following this tuck, in a principal-agent approach applied to the health system, 
Bossert (1998, p. 1518) proposes the concept of “decision space” defined as “the range of 
effective choice that is allowed by the central authorities (the principal) to be utilized by local 
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authorities (the agents)”. Decision space is defined in terms of functions and degrees of 
choice over which local authorities, in case of decentralisation, will have increased power. 
Five functions are considered: (i) finance, (ii) service organization, (iii) human resources, (iv) 
access rules, and, (v) governance rules. Each function is, in turn, divided into “choices”. For 
example, regarding the finance function, three choices are proposed: source of revenue, 
allocation of expenditure, fees, and, contracts. Quantifiable indicators are proposed for each 
choice. In the case of  the finance example the three choices are respectively quantified as  
“intergovernmental transfers as percent of total local health spending”, “percent of local 
spending that is explicitly earmarked by higher authorities”, “range of prices local authorities 
are allowed”, and,  “number of models allowed” Bossert (1998, p.1519). Complete and 
exhaustive description of the methodology goes further this paper’s purpose. Interested 
readers are addressed to following table 1 for further details, two final considerations are still 
important developing here about the approach under discussion. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
First, since it focuses on static measures, it considers decentralisation as a “state” 
rather than as a process, capturing synthesised decentralised function “one shot” rather than 
following its evolution during time. Second, in terms of the continuum between centralisation 
and decentralisation, its point of view is based on power and resources received by lower-
level institution. A different perspective is proposed by Schneider (2003) which aims to 
measure decentralisation in terms of the degree to which power and resources are taken away 
from central governments, based on the consideration that “all forms of decentralization, 
regardless of the recipient, involve shifting power and resources away from the central 
government” (Schneider, 2003, p.35). Furthermore, Schneider (2003)’s main contribution to 
the decentralisation measurement issue consists in clearly considering a tripartite (fiscal, 
administrative, political) dimension of decentralisation empirically (testing and) supporting 
the assumption that these dimensions could be considered independent (or orthogonal). 
Indeed, according to arguments mentioned above regarding the methodological difficulty to 
use a single metric to deal with decentralisation,  these dimensions have been considered 
independently by many studies and are worth reviewing separately.    
 
 
Fiscal decentralisation   
 
Fiscal decentralisation (or fiscal federalism) refers to “how much governments cede fiscal 
impact to non-central government entities” (Schneider, 2003, p. 33). A more articulated 
definition is provided by pointing out that, from a broader economic perspective, the scope of 
state rescaling involves four main activities; namely, regulation, financing, administration, 
and service delivery (Philip, 1954). However, panel data on regulation can not easily be used 
for cross-countries studies. Therefore, this concept is of little significance in empirical 
studies. Analysis based on remaining three roles of government can be synthesised as the 
analysis of the scope of the relative roles of levels of government in financing, 
administration, and service deliver. Furthermore, these processes are “encapsulated” in the 
state’s activities dealing with revenue collection and public expenditure. Hence, according to 
Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2009, p. 86) fiscal decentralization consists of an increased 
role of sub-national governments “in the vertical government distribution of powers for 
raising and spending public resources”.  
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 The latter definition of fiscal decentralisation addresses directly the issue of its 
measurement. Indeed, a common measure of fiscal decentralisation is represented by the ratio 
of subnational government spending to general government spending (Rodríguez-Pose and 
Gill, 2004; Oates, 2006). This choice is made also in order to take into account that 
frequently different functions, rather than being exclusive responsibility of a single 
jurisdiction, are shared across different jurisdictions.  Thus, the underlying idea is that the 
more a jurisdiction has decision-making power the higher its share in total expenditure.   
   
From a different perspective fiscal decentralisation is measured in literature as the 
ratio of locally generated revenue to the general government revenue. Also a mixed 
(considering together expenditure and revenue measures) proxy is proposed by Boetti et al. 
(2010) defining fiscal autonomy “as the percentage of current expenditures in selected 
functions covered by local taxes” in order to capture the incentive scheme arising under 
devolution. The underlying idea of measures considering the revenue side is based on how 
much local government are responsible for financing public goods delivery. Both indicator 
based on expenditure and on tax revenue present, however, several drawbacks. Indeed, the 
subnational expenditure ratio of total expenditure (i) is not able to distinguish between  tax 
and non-tax revenue sources, at the same time as (ii) it does not capture the type and  
proportion of intergovernmental transfers that could negatively affect the real degree of 
separateness enjoyed by lower level of government in case where it is constrained to act as a 
spending agent of the upper-level governments (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002; Martinez-Vazquez 
and Timofeev, 2009); in addition, such a measure (iii) does not take into account efficiency 
(so that increased subnational expenditure, rather than registering higher importance in 
service provision, could reflect lower levels of efficiency) population structure and, 
especially in the case of sector-based expenditure, local preferences (Martinez-Vazquez and 
Timofeev, 2009).   
  
Furthermore, simply considering the share of local expenditure does not allow to  
consider the structure and the development of production process involving devolved public 
goods and could be misleading if the division of tasks between central/local government is 
consistent with a capital/labour intensive production function criterion. According to 
“Baumol (1967)’s disease”, as a result of the technological progress, goods characterised by a 
labour intensive production function will register increased (relative) production costs. 
Therefore, the level of government responsible for the production of goods characterised by a 
labour intensive process (e.g. education, amusement) will require (and manage) a higher 
amount of resources without increasing to any extent its relative power.    
  
 Fiscal decentralization measured as a ratio of locally generated revenues to the 
general government revenue, for its part, helps to overcome the first problem of expenditure 
measures complementing them in the sense that it takes into account how much local 
governments finance their functions independently. However, this second measure of fiscal 
decentralization presents a problem which is to some extent symmetric to the second problem 
presented discussing about the expenditure side. That is to say, (a) it could overestimate 
central government’s role if a large portion of revenue is collected centrally and transferred 
to lower level governments. In this case central government does act as collection agent of 
the lower level of government.     
 
 An additional problem related to this measure that has not been explicitly considered 
interpreting different measures of decentralisation based on tax revenue lies on the (potential) 
difference between formal assignment of resources and the real amount that a local 
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government could manage adopting a strategic behaviour
3
 in presence of  “soft budget 
constraints” (Kornai, 1979; Kornai et al., 2003).   
  
 In short, if local government acts under the expectation that its (eventual) fiscal deficit 
will be covered by a higher level (often the central) government, then the total amount of 
resources formally devolved to local government in order to delivery its policies 
(independently from the centre) is only a part of the story because the real amount of 
resources might be much higher. The issue is posed by Oates (2006) in terms of “raiding of 
the fiscal commons” pointing out that, rather than being an hypothetic case, this could happen 
even in presence of a formal statement of central state asserting that it will not come to the 
fiscal rescue of lower levels
4
. Hence, the local/total generated revenue ratio clearly 
underestimates the power of local government in rising resources. 
 
 For reasons aforementioned a single decentralization ratio is not able to capture the 
whole distribution of powers between different levels of government. Nonetheless, opportune 
transformations of measures proposed above have been proposed in order to better capture 
partial aspects overcoming some of problems presented above. At this purpose Martinez-
Vazquez and Timofeev (2009) develop modified decentralization ratio measures in order to 
capture three state’s activities separately: financing, administration, and, service delivery. 
Consequently, the authors measure responsibility for financing public services as total 
expenditures of a given government net of received grants. The power of administration is 
measured as the total expenditures of a given government net of grants provided to other 
governments. Finally, public expenditure of a government net of grants and contracts 
awarded to private contractors can be view as a measure of the responsibility for service 
delivery. 
 
Regarding contracts with private sector, should be noted that even if they represents a 
form of “delegation”, typically, subnational governments maintain their responsibility for the 
final service delivery outcomes as part of the retained power of service administration 
(Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev, 2009). Regarding other measures, although (as noted by 
the authors) these measures could be further refined given data availability, all “modified” 
measure will share the same underlying idea that is worth stating explicitly: due to several 
reasons (fiscal competition, tax exporting, uneven territorial tax base distribution, inter-
jurisdictional externalities, redistributive objectives, imposition of minimal standard services 
supply like  essential assistance levels in health, satisfaction of  special interest groups or 
leviathan concerns for the regional governments) transfers, both general and in-kind,  have a 
crucial role in financing lower levels of government.   
  
Hence, bargaining over transfer involving different levels of government is a sensitive 
field in the federal fiscal setting which outcome could have strong consequence both in 
distributive and efficacy terms. The issue has been addressed in literature both assuming 
benevolent government-Nash players and assuming that actors can strategically use transfers 
for re-election or even for subsiding special interest groups (Boadway and Flatters, 1982; 
Bordignon et al., 1996; Keen, 1997; Baretti et al., 2000; Caplan et al., 2000; Adelberger, 
2001; Pitlik et al., 2001; Lucas, 2004). Consequently, considering grants together with tax 
                                                 
3
 Differences due to shocks and related to the “insurance role” of the state (Lockwood, 1999) are not relevant to 
the case at hand since they rather than being systematic will appear just occasionally  
4
 Rodden et al. (2003) basing their analysis on case-studies, highlight several causes of this phenomenon:  fiscal 
institutions, the structure of the political system, the absence (or weakness) of certain key markets, and, the 
specific history of intergovernmental fiscal relations in the country. 
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revenue and expenditure institutionally imputed to lower levels of government contributes to 
take into accounts a network of financial relations (reflecting a setting of powers) that 
otherwise would be neglected or misinterpreted. A further criticism addressed to all measures 
based on financial data – despite consisting in shares – consists in being unable, in general, to 
distinguish among levels of subnational government (Marks et al., 2008)
5
.  
 
In conclusion it is forth stressing that fiscal federalism refers to the spatial distribution 
of power over financial activity of the state. Along this dimension, all decentralisation’s 
alternative measures share the methodological aspect of being ratios between local and 
national datum. However, none of several measures proposed by different studies is able to 
capture all aspects of the fiscal impact of the state and each measure offers only a partial view 
of the whole set of powers. 
 
Administrative decentralisation 
 
Continuing to follow Schneider (2003, p. 33), administrative decentralisation “refers to how 
much autonomy non-central government entities posses relative to central control”. More 
precisely, moving from Rondinelli et al. (1984), autonomy could be articulated in 
decisionmaking authority, personnel control, and, control over public finance. Treisman 
(2002) aiming to develop a “global perspective on decentralisation” deals with the meaning 
and measurement of the three dimensions.   
  
To begin with, the author points out that decisionmaking decentralisation “focuses on 
how the authority to make political decisions is distributed among different tiers” (Treisman 
2002, p. 6). At this regard, decentralisation could be considered among two dimensions: (i) 
how rights to decide on specific questions are distribuited among tiers, or (ii) how decision-
making takes place on a given question.  
 
Similarly, according to Marks et al. (2008)’s general formalisation is a matter of 
territory in which governments exercise authority; the depth of that authority; and the spheres 
of action over which they exercise authority. Constitutions are the locus in which these 
relationships are formally defined. Therefore, the issue could be addressed in terms of 
constitutional concurrent (legislative) powers and exclusive competencies. Indeed, in 
decentralised setting, central level of government has the primary responsibility but lower 
levels of it have the power to change central government’s low if they want. Furthermore, 
decisionmaking decentralisation is also enhanced if subnational actors have – to some extent 
- the right to shape central decisions like when an upper house of parliament that represents 
subnational governments or electorates is constituted. 
 
Although the theoretical framework is fascinating clear, “the problems defining and 
measuring decisionmaking decentralization are so daunting that, were decisionmaking not the 
crucial question in debates over decentralization, it would be tempting to abandon the 
concept” (Treisman, 2002, p. 8). In order to take into account both legislative power and 
subnational representation in central decisional bodies, Treisman (2002)’s approach 
considers, in addition to “autonomy” (referring to situations in which subnationa tier has 
exclusive competency), “weak autonomy”, “residual authority”, and, “subnational veto” 
categories.  
 
                                                 
5
 Regarding this issue readers are addressed to section 5. 
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Weak autonomy characterises cases in which constitution reserves exclusive right to 
legislate on at least one specific policy area to subnational legislatures and/or subnational 
legislatures have “residual authority”. Residual authority refers to cases in which constitution 
gives subnational legislatures exclusive right to legislate on policy areas not specifically 
assigned in constitution. Subnational veto labels situations in which regionally-chosen upper 
house of parliament has constitutional right to block legislation. Thus, “residual authority” is 
a subset of “weak autonomy” and together account for legislative power at lower level of 
government, while “subnational veto” is used to measure lower levels’ power at central (level 
of) government. 
  
Regarding the second dimension of administrative decentralisation introduced above - 
i.e. personnel decentralisation – it refers to how administrative resources are distributed 
across tiers of government in the sense that the greater the share of administrative personnel 
employed at lower tiers, the greater is personnel decentralisation. As Treisman (2002, p. 13) 
pointed out “the distribution of manpower can become as politically charged as the 
distribution of decisionmaking authority”. This was the case, for example, in the debates over 
the draft US constitution with the antifederalists sustaining the argument  that a well-staffed 
central government might overawe the state governments (Rossiter, 1961). The measure 
proposed consists in the share of subnational governments in total government administration 
employees. 
 
From a different perspective Schneider (2003) points out that administrative 
decentralisation could be interpreted as a matter of control over resources. Therefore, 
coherently with this perspective, a different way to measure levels of local administrative 
autonomy is proposed by the Author based on the control exercised over local revenue. More 
precisely, the proposed measure consists in the percentage of local revenues from taxes. In 
order to properly understand this measure should be noted that taxes substantially differ from 
resources. Indeed, if  resources considered as a whole including also transfers, grants, and 
loans represent an indicator of wealth, taxes, being characterised by the higher level of 
discretionary power, measure the autonomy enjoyed by lower-level governments in 
collecting their own resources independently from conditions and limits (often applied to 
transfer and grants) posed by central government.  
 
However, measure other than taxes, consistently with the main idea of measuring 
administrative decentralisation as control over resources, could be used to compute a second 
measure of subnational autonomy defined as the percentage of total grants and revenues not 
accounted for by transfers. Certainly, excluding the whole category of transfers is not a 
refined criterion as it does not distinguish between transfers assigning certain resources under 
the total control of the lower level of government and transfers that act as central 
government’s instrument to achieve its own objective (e.g. earmarked transfers or transfers 
that require certain behaviours by subnational governments). Nevertheless, this second 
measure considering taxes, loans, fees, sales of assets, and informal contributions takes into 
account the degree to which subnational governments raise their own funds in a broader way 
with respect to the previous one based only on taxes.  
 
To summarise: administrative decentralisation, considered along its three main 
dimension consisting of decision making and control both over personnel and financial 
resources, has been measured in terms of constitutional setting (decision making power)  and, 
as for fiscal decentralisation, in terms of ratio between local and national values of respective 
variables. However, measures presented above, especially those based on resources, once 
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more, offers only a partial picture of the phenomenon sharing with fiscal decentralisation the 
weakness of not considering the political dimension of the process of state rescaling. Indeed, 
democratic representation is a crucial issue at this regard labelled as “political 
decentralisation” which is the object of next section. 
 
Political Decentralisation  
 
Similarly to the case of fiscal decentralisation, political decentralisation could be analysed 
according to spatial distribution of (political) functions. In fact, all political systems perform 
six main processes (i.e. mobilization, organization, articulation, participation, contestation, 
and aggregation of interests) with different territorial scope. According to this perspective 
decentralized political systems are those characterised by intensive (and at least partially 
independent from those at the national level) exercise of these functions at the local level 
(Fox and Aranda, 1996; Schneider, 2003).  
 
Referring to this issue Treisman (2002, p. 11) talks about electoral decentralisation 
“to mean the proportion of tiers at which direct elections are held to pick executives (or 
legislators who then choose an executive form their number)”. Thus,  on the measurement 
side, the degree of decentralisation is conducted to a single metric by measuring it in terms of 
representation intended as the way political institutions map the multiplicity of citizen 
interests onto policy decisions (Litvack et al., 2000); the proxy utilised consists in some 
measure of the existence of elections at local level  (Schneider, 2003). 
 
 At this regard it is worth stressing that the existence of election at lower level of 
government is not simply an issue of democracy, rather it looks at the manner in which local 
political actors are selected. The underlying idea is that institutions are the tool by which 
public interests are mobilised, organised, and articulated in order to be translated in policy 
(Berger, 1983). Although there are many forms in which this process of translation of 
interests into policy takes palce (e.g. NGOs, social movement, interest organisation, political 
parties, corporations, etc.), when elections occur at local level competitors are “forced” to 
tailor their platforms to local concerns. Hence, in presence of elections at local level both the 
political debate and subsequent policies are developed at local level as well.    
  
 Certainly, this proxy is not exhaustive of all forms of political decentralisation. For 
example, as mentioned above, participation could have different forms unrelated to elections.  
Moreover, according to the different scale involved in the elective process decentralisation 
could achieve different degree of importance and such a measure based merely on a 
dichotomised (existence or inexistence) approach is not able to capture this dimension effect
6
. 
However, has been pointed out that “electoral components are the most valid indicator […] as 
they tap into fundamental aspect of political authority” (Schneider, 2003, p. 40). Therefore, 
considering elections means considering the way in which local interests gain representation 
and, in turn, executive power. 
 
3. Deconcentration, Delegation and Devolution 
 
The issue of conceptualisation of deconcentration, delegation, and devolution has received 
different solution over time. Indeed, if they was initially intended as three distinct categories 
                                                 
6
 Even considering the proportion of tiers does not mean taking into account their dimension and relative 
importance to the national context. 
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belonging to administrative decentralisation (Rondinelli, 1990), subsequently (Cohen and 
Petterson, 1996; Schneider, 2003) they was intended as “nothing more than points along a 
continuum of administrative autonomy” (Schneider, 2003, p. 38) indicating different 
configurations of central-local relationships associated with a hierarchical distribution of 
authority. Nevertheless, this paper, without challenging the current mainstream approach, 
presents them separately from administrative decentralisation with the purpose of a clearer 
exposition.  
 
Deconcentration  
 
Cohen and Petterson (1996, p. 10) define deconcentration as “the transfer of authority over 
specified decision-making, financial, and management functions by administrative means to 
different levels under the jurisdictional authority of the central government” pointing out that, 
from the point of view of the hierarchical distribution of power, this type of decentralisation 
is the least extensive one characterising late developing countries.  Similarly, Schneider 
(2003, p.38) talks about a dispersion of responsibility that “changes the spatial and 
geographical distribution of authority, but does not significantly change the autonomy of the 
entity that receive the authority”. Thus, deconcentration could be intended just as an act of 
exercise of central government’s authority along  its hierarchical channel, which is by no 
means transferred to the local one. 
 
Delegation  
 
“Delegation refers to the transfer of government decision-making and administrative 
authority and/or responsibility for carefully spelled out tasks to institutions and organizations 
that are either under its indirect control or independent” (Cohen and Petterson,  1996, p. 11). 
Under delegation central government establish a contractual relationship with an external 
body often charged to deal with technical issues which enjoy a level of autonomy higher than 
in the case of deconcentration (Central Banks are typical examples). Indeed, it worth 
stressing that in case of delegation, receiving institutions are not under the direct control of 
central government, rather they remain accountable to it. 
 
 Empirically, the delegation process often involves transfer of responsibility to state 
owned enterprises and urban or regional development corporations. Moreover, central and 
local government are delegating tasks, such as refuse collection and road repair, by contract 
to private firms. Usually this process is modelled in terms of politicians (principal) assigning 
competencies and ceding part of their authority in certain fields to bureaucrats (agents) for 
several reasons  such as technical nature of the issue, time constraint, asymmetrical 
information, transaction costs, timeliness necessities,  unwillingness to adopt unpopular 
policies, risk transfer, credibility, and efficiency. 
 
 Hence, this circumstance and its related consequences in terms of effects both on 
policy and outcome have been systematically addressed by the body of literature labelled 
“bureaucracy theory”. From a normative point of view, Weber (1972) argues that the 
selection and appointment process allow politicians (principals) to exert an effective (even if) 
indirect control over deputed actors, assuring, in turn, that agents’ objective coincide with the 
principal’s ones. Nevertheless, on the positive ground, Weber (1972)’s argument have been 
challenged in favour of the existence of strategic behaviour between the two parts. Indeed, 
although argument based on bureaucrat perfect self-determination has been questioned 
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(Breton and Wintrobe 1975)
7
, there are authors (often adopting a neoclassical approach) 
arguing that under delegation public officials could prosecute their own objectives that not 
necessarily match those of their principals. Niskanen (1975) assumes that budget’s size is the 
real objective of the bureaucrat. Following this hypothesis he argued that due to asymmetrical 
information in favour of the bureaucrat, this latter could obtain a budget that is oversized with 
respect to the optimal one. Migué and Bélanger (1971) enlarge the view allowing the 
bureaucrat to have, in general terms, additional objective with respect to budget size. As a 
result, in their model, bureaucrats strategically using their “managerial discretion” achieve an 
intermediate outcome (in terms of budget size) between optimal and Niskanen (1975)’s 
maximum size
8
.  
 
Going further into this field is beyond this paper’s purpose; however, it is worth 
noting that moving from argument developed above, this process could have important 
effects in terms of policy delivery and democracy.   
 
 Devolution 
 
“Under devolution, the central government allows quasi-autonomous local units of 
government to exercise power and control over the transferred policy” (Schneider, 2003, p. 
38).  
 
Moreover,  
  
Devolution requires that local governments be given autonomy and independence, and be 
clearly perceived of as a separate level over which central authorities exercise little or no 
direct control. Local governments should be given clear and legally recognized geographical 
boundaries over which they exercise authority, and within which they perform public 
functions (Rondinelli et al., 1989, p.75).  
 
 Often, “devolution” is used as a synonym of “decentralisation” both in the academic 
and political debate and is also interchanged with it. For example, Rodríguez-Pose and Gill 
(2004), analysing the existence of a global link between inequality and “devolution”, even 
clearly pointing out that “devolutionary initiatives often assume legislative and administrative 
characteristics and are not necessarily fully reflected in quantifiable fiscal resource 
decentralization” (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2004, p. 10), use the share of subnational 
government in total national public expenditure as proxy of fiscal devolutionary 
development. Nevertheless, Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2009) referring to 
“decentralisation” use the same measure, the subnational share in total government 
expenditure, clearly labelling it as a proxy of fiscal “decentralisation”. 
 
 Indeed, sharply divide the two terms is rather trouble. Yet, a possible way to separate 
the two terms consists in approaching the issue in terms of degree of autonomy related to 
each one. Thus, if decentralisation is a general term referring to the transfer of responsibility 
and power with no precise reference to the degree of autonomy, devolution is a more 
narrowed term belonging to the administrative type of it and, in particular, among the three 
types of administrative decentralisation considered in this section, devolution could be 
                                                 
7
 Bureaucrats compete each other to obtain funds, while politicians are accountable to citizen by mean of the 
electoral moment. This competition is able to provide a setting able to exert a control similar to the market one.  
8
 Formally, the bureaucrats will choose that point on their budget line where the marginal rate of substitution 
between formal output and other expenses equals the slope of their budget line. 
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distinguished by other forms because is characterised by the highest degree of autonomy 
assigned to lower-level receiving unit(s). According to the “devolution setting” central 
government has a only a limited range of actions in order to limit local government 
autonomy. Essentially they are based on resources control (threat of withhold) and (change in 
the distribution of) responsibility. Regarding its measurement, as for the measurement of 
deconcentration and delegation, in literature, to the best of our knowledge, there are no 
attempts to measure this forms of decentralisation separately from (fiscal) decentralisation.  
 
Table 2 aims to summarise different forms and measures of decentralisation presented 
above. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
 
  
4. Federalism, federal political system and federations 
 
Federalism, federal political system and federations are terms often utilised in the literature 
on state rescaling especially in the form of fiscal federalism. In this regard it is worth noticing 
that, despite the evident fortune of the term “federalism” as formula in the political and 
academic discourse, similarly to “de-term” discussed above, there is a conceptual debate 
about also concerning its definition. 
 
 As noted by Sepos (2003) a first distinction was made by King (1982) between the 
normative term “federalism” and its positive meaning “federation”. The former referring to 
the set of argument in favour of multi-tiered government, and the latter referring to the 
empirical realisation of a particular setting of multi-tiered institutional relationship. 
Therefore, federalism, as normative principle, represents the theoretical framework aiming at 
combining unity and diversity by the perpetuation of both union and non-centralization at the 
same time. “Federations” refer to a constitutional setting in which neither the federal nor the 
constituent units of government - directly elected by its citizens - are subordinate to the other 
in the exercise of legislative, executive and taxing powers. This circumstance is often 
expressed in terms of sovereign powers derived from the constitution rather than another 
level of government (Sepos, 2003).  
 
 More deeply, federations are characterised by: i) two orders of government each 
acting directly on their citizens; ii) a formal constitutional distribution of legislative and 
executive authority and allocation of revenue resources between two orders of government 
ensuring some areas of genuine autonomy for each order; iii) provision for the designated 
representation of distinct regional views within the federal policy-making institutions, usually 
provided by the a supreme, written constitution not unilaterally amendable and requiring the 
consent of a significant proportion of the constituent units; iv) an umpire (in the form of 
courts or provision for referendums) to rule on disputes between governments; v) processes 
and institutions to facilitate intergovernmental collaboration for those areas where 
governmental responsibilities are shared or inevitably overlap (Watts, 1996).  
 
 Furthermore, Watts (1996) proposed a tripartite distinction: federalism, federal 
political systems, and federations. According to this approach between “federalism” and 
“federations” (intended as above) a third concept – federal political system - has to be 
inserted in order to refer to a broad category (or genus) of political systems characterised by 
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the existence of two (or more) levels of government which combine elements of shared rule
9
 
through common institutions and regional self-rule for the governments of the constituent 
units. 
 
 However, for Elazar (1987, 1994) and Burgess and Gagnon (1993), both federalism 
and federation are descriptive terms. According to them, the difference lies in the fact that 
while “federalism” refers to a genus of political organization, federations belong to its species 
comprising confederacies, associated statehoods, unions, leagues, condominiums, 
constitutional regionalization, and constitutional 'home rule'. Similarly, Riker (1975, p. 101) 
asserted that “federalism is a political organization in which the activities of government are 
divided between regional governments and a central government in such a way that each kind 
of government has some activities on which it makes final decision”. 
 
 It is worth stressing that in so doing, “federalism” is deprived of any normative 
meaning and, as a result, assumes only a descriptive nature. Therefore, without a clear 
specification, it is unclear if using the term “federalism” one is referring to its normative 
meaning - based also on a certain scale of values - or to an empirical realisation of it.    
 
On the measurement side, as noted by Blume and Voigt (2008), the most often 
utilised measure of federalism consist in a dummy variable (Elazar, 1995; Kearny, 1999; 
Watts 1999; Derbyshire and Derbyshire, 1999) assuming value “1” for federal systems. 
Therefore, on the measurement side researchers follow a dichotomist approach that does not 
allow us to capture different shades in the federalist structures of different states involving 
both their internal structure and the cross-country dimension. This last issue will be addressed 
in next section reviewing Marks et al. (2008)’s approach based on “regional authority”.  
Indeed, the following approach focus on the “region” as the sub-national unit even if many 
other levels of analysis (e.g. city-regions and sub-regions) have been used in literature, 
attempting to highlight the internal (regional) structure of the state allowing different 
“degree” of regional authority. 
 
5. Regionalisation 
 
The approaches developed above based either on financial data or on some structural 
(considered) fixed characteristic have been questioned by Marks et al. (2008). In particular, 
regarding widespread measures based on financial data it was argued that they are unable to 
capture the real degree of autonomy enjoyed by lower level of government. Moreover, such a 
measure is not able to distinguish between lower levels of government treating them as a 
whole
10
. Regarding other measures based on institutional characteristics, an important 
disadvantage pointed out by the Authors consists in adopting a dichotomist 
(centralisation/decentralisation) static approach. 
 
 Indeed,   
                                                 
9
 For “shared rule” and “self-rule” terms, coined by Elazar (1987), see section 5. 
10
 This argument is valid though exception should be registered among innovative source of data. For example 
the Italian databank “Conti Pubblici Territoriali” (i.e. Regional Public Accounts) provides data in which both 
expenditure and revenue of lower levels of government are divided into national. regional, local public 
administration (essentially municipalities), national public corporation, and local public corporations. Therefore, 
such a system provides an important level of detail regarding the level of government involved in the financial 
flows under consideration. However, to the case at hand should be noted that despite these data are consistent 
with the COFOG international standard, in the lack of similar data available for other countries their 
significance will be of little moment due to the impossibility to use them for international comparison.           
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these data are direct, but relatively crude, measures of the number of subnational levels, and 
categorizations of, for example, federal versus non-federal systems, whether or not 
subnational governments have residual powers, whether or not the central state can veto 
subnational decisions, whether or not subnational executives are elected, and whether or not 
subnational governments have revenue-raising authority” (Marks et al., 2008, p.112). 
 
 The criticism developed against this approach is based on the argument that, in so 
doing, they “tap the extent to which the national state monopolizes authority, but they do not 
tell us how government below the national level is structured, [...] [because] they conceive 
government within countries in unidimensional terms as the ‘other’, the ‘not central state’” 
(Marks et al., 2008, p. 112). Furthermore, it was argued that measures under consideration are 
biased against temporal variation (Rodden, 2004). 
  
These are serious limitation in order to empirically analyse cases since they miss to 
capture the “massive variation—over historical time and cross-sectionally—in the shape of 
government” (Marks et al., 2008, p. 112) 
 
In order to overcome problems developed above the authors propose an approach 
based on “regional authority”. Regional authority is conceptualised along two main 
dimensions: self rule and shared rule. Self rule refers to the independence of a regional 
government from central domination and the scope of regional decision making. Shared rule 
refers to the capacity of a regional government to shape central decision making. Each 
dimension is then operationalised according to four distinct observable characteristics. 
 
Self-rule is operationalised as the extent to which a regional government has an 
independent executive, the scope of its policy competencies, its capacity to tax, and the extent 
to which it has an independent legislature. Shared rule is operationalised by dividing central 
government decision making process into four areas, namely normal legislation, executive 
policy, taxation, and constitutional reform. Finally, for each observable a subset of empirical 
situation are coded in order to assign a numeric value to them.  
 
To summarise: regional authority is thought as composed by self rule and shared rule. 
Both self rule and shared rule are operationalised according to four dimensions each. These 
dimensions, in turn, receive a numerical value according to a codification system. A complete 
and exhaustive description of methodology is beyond this paper’s purpose; however tables 2 
and 3 aim at better clarifying how it works. 
 
Table 3 below presents the four main dimension of shared and self rule.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE 
 
 While the following table 4 shows how numeric values are assigned to the first 
dimension of self rule (i.e. institutional depth).  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE 
 
According to the authors this methodology should be able to disaggregate regional 
authority, in order to measure it against observable variation among regions in a wide range 
of developed societies, at the same time as to encompass what is meant by regional authority. 
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In so doing, they propose a general measure of regional authority synthesising different kind 
of “decentralisation” measures separately considered across studies reviewed above. 
Moreover, that measure has also a general validity in the sense that can be used as an ordinal 
measure of regional authority; as an interval measure of regional authority; and as an absolute 
measure of institutional reform. 
 
However, even if the approach based on regional authority, as said, propose a general 
perspective, it does not take into account how globalisation affect the (structure of the) 
national state. Indeed, the structure of the state is not only affected by an internal 
restructuring process, but also by general trends involving (formal or informal) transfers of 
authority external forces and actors. Next section will review how this issue has been 
addressed in literature. 
 
6. Denationalisation, Destatisation and Internationalisation  
 
In addition to trends involving the internal distribution of power and competencies which 
have been treated above, states’ transformations involve also forces and actors external to 
state apparatus intended in the traditional meaning.  At this regard it is worth stressing that, 
especially under the “glocalisation”11 (Robertson, 1992) process, forms (i.e. central-local 
balance between resources and responsibilities) and outcome of decentralisation can be 
influenced by actors at both national and sub-national level (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2005) 
 
 In order to take into account in a general manner these phenomena Jessop (2002) 
individuates three main trends: denationalisation, destatisation, internationalization of policy 
regimes. 
 
Denationalisation  refers to the 'hollowing out' of the national state apparatus with old 
and new state capacities being reorganized territorially and functionally on subnational, 
national, supra-national, and trans-local levels. Therefore, in addition to the devolution of 
authority to subnational levels of government and to “the development of transnational but 
inter-local policy making”, the concept of denationalisation encompasses the loss of formal 
sovereignty in favour of supranational bodies
12
. 
 
 Destatisation “is reflected in a shift from government to governance on various 
territorial scales and across various functional domains”. Hence, destatisation consists in a 
generalised erosion of the central role of the state as political institutionalised actor in favour 
to partnership between governmental, para-governmental and non-governmental actors. As a 
result of this process the state is to become “first among equals” (Jessop, 2002).   
 
 Internationalisation refers to the fact that the international context of domestic state 
action has extended to include a widening range of extra-territorial or transnational factors 
and processes; and it has also become more significant strategically for domestic policy.  The 
key word here is “international competition”. The term refers to the circumstance that 
pursuing this objective, pushed by neoliberal thinking, foreign agents and institutions have 
gained a role as source of policy ideas, policy design and implementation (Gourevitch, 1978; 
Doern et al., 1996). 
                                                 
11
 The term is used to refer to the phenomenon where globalization and localization forces act simultaneously in 
determining state policies and outcome.  
12
 According to the author, on the empirical side this process is clear at the EU level , but also affects NAFTA 
and other intergovernmental regional blocs. 
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 Thus, the three terms together offer a general view of the phenomena of state 
restructuring considering both internal (to its structure and territory) and external shifts if 
authority. However, on the measurement side, apart from Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev 
(2009, p. 91) that measure destatisation intended as “diminishing role of the state vis-à-vis the 
private sector” in terms of government revenue or consumption relative to GDP, this 
generality is not accompanied by a clear system and methodology able to give a “numerical” 
dynamic representation of ongoing processes which would be a powerful tool in order to 
develop empirical analysis in this field.  
 
 Table 5 summarises general forms of state restructuring process treated in sections 4, 
5, and 6. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 AROUND HERE 
 
7. Concluding Remark 
 
This paper presented a conceptual analysis of terms belonging to the semantic field of state 
restructuring according to a synoptic perspective and with particular attention paid to 
concepts expressing forms, types and extent of decentralisation. 
  
 The analysis aimed at reviewing different terms focusing the attention both to the 
definitional and to the measurement moment. In particular, it moved from separately 
considering “types of decentralisation” towards a generalised approach aiming both at 
conceptualising and operationalising   “regional authority” inside the internal structure of the 
state.  
 
 In so doing, it has been shown that despite the huge diversity involving meanings and 
measures, deriving also from the multidisciplinary interest in this field, the research of a 
common analytical framework could be grounded on the conceptualisation and measurement 
of the balance of power, responsibilities, and competencies between central state and other 
bodies both at sub-national and international level. 
  
 While methodological and conceptual differences focus on direction of change, 
degree, type, and nature of attribution involved. According to this argument, after dealing 
with the main issue of defining and measuring decentralisation, in the final part the discourse 
is further generalised in order to take into account also external actors linking the analysis 
with the analytical framework of globalisation.    
 
The analysis confirms the persistence of a strong potential for confusion generating 
from the multitude of meaning attached to the term “decentralisation” and its related terms. 
However, having assembled (without any claim of completeness) terms together contributes 
to clarify and to interpret them more critically and in a more focused way.  Moreover, the 
attention paid to the measurement side of the issue contributes also critically to interpret 
empirical analyses already realised in literature and, in perspective, could be a promising 
starting point for more focused future research.      
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1. Decentralisation categories. 
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Table 1 – Indicators for mapping decision space. Source: adapted from Bossert, 1998) 
Function Indicator Range of choice 
 
 
 
  
Narrow 
 
moderate 
 
wide 
Finance     
Source of revenue 
 
Allocation of expenditure 
 
Fees 
Contracts 
intergovernmental transfers as 
% of total local health spending 
% of local spending that is explicitly earmarked 
by higher 
authorities 
range of prices local authorities are allowed to 
choose  
number of models allowed 
 
high % 
 
high% 
no choice or narrow range 
 
mid% 
 
mid% 
moderate range 
 
low% 
 
low% 
no limits  
Service organization     
Hospital autonomy  
Insurance plans 
Payment mechanisms 
 
Required programs 
 
choice of range of autonomy for hospitals 
choice of how to design insurance plans 
choice of how providers will be paid 
(incentives and non-salaried) 
specificity of norms for local programs 
 
defined by low or higher authority 
 
rigid norms 
 
several models for local choice 
 
flexible norms 
 
no limits 
 
 
few or no norms 
Human resources     
Salaries 
Contract 
Civil service 
 
choice of salary range 
contracting non-permanent staff 
hiring and firing permanent staff 
 
defined by low or higher authority 
none or defined by higher authority 
national civil service 
 
moderate salary range defined 
several model for local choice 
local civil service 
no limits 
no limits 
no civil service 
Access rules     
Targeting defining priority populations law or defined by higher authority several model for local choice no limits 
Governance rules     
Facility boards 
District offices 
Community participation 
size and composition of boards 
size and composition of local offices 
size, number, composition, and role of 
community participation  
 
law or defined by higher authority 
 
 
several model for local choice 
 
no limits 
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Table 2 - Decentralisation concepts and measures. Source: author’s research. 
Decentralisation 
refers to a central government that disperses responsibilities for a policy to its field offices in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy 
  Fiscal Political  Administrative Deconcentration Delegation Devolution 
Definition 
refers to how much 
central governments 
cede fiscal impact to 
non-central government 
entities 
refers to the degree to 
which central 
government allow non-
central government 
entities to undertake the 
political functions of 
governance; degree to 
which political actors 
and issues are 
significant at the local 
level and are at least 
partially independent 
from those at the 
national level.  
refers to how much 
autonomy non-
central government 
entities posses 
relative to central 
control 
refers to a central 
government that 
disperses 
responsibility for a 
policy  to its field 
offices; powers are 
transferred to lower-
level actors who are 
accountable to their 
superiors in a 
hierarchy 
transfer of policy 
responsibility to 
local government or 
semiautonomous 
organizations that 
are not controlled by 
the central 
government but 
remain accountable 
to it.  
the central 
government 
allows quasi-
autonomous 
local units of 
government to 
exercise power 
and control 
over the 
transferred 
policy. 
Measurement  
(simple or modified 
measures of) ratio of 
subnational government 
spending/revenue to 
general government 
datum 
 
existence of elections at 
the municipal level or at 
the state/provincial level 
percentage of local 
revenue from taxes; 
percentage of total 
grants and revenue 
not accounted by 
transfer  
Forms of administrative decentralisation not individually  
measured  
Main references 
Oates (1972); Zhang and 
Zou (1998); Davoodi 
and Zou (1998);  
Schneider (2003); 
(Rodríguez-Pose and 
Ezcurra 2009) Martinez-
Vazquez and  Timofeev 
(2009): 
Schneider (2003) Schneider (2003) Schneider (2003); Rondinelli (1983)  
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Table 3 – Dimensions of Regional Authority 
Self-rule The authority exercised by a regional 
government over those who live in its territory   
 
institutional depth  
 
 
policy scope 
 
 
fiscal autonomy  
 
 
representation  
the extent to which a regional government 
autonomous rather than deconcentrated. 
 
the range of policies for which a regional 
government is responsible.  
 
the extent to which a regional government can 
independently tax its population. 
 
the extent to which a regional government is 
endowed with an independent legislature and 
executive 
0-3 
 
 
0-4 
 
 
0-4 
 
 
0-4 
Shared rule  Authority  exercised by a regional government 
pr its representative in the country as a whole 
 
law making  
 
 
executive control  
 
 
 
fiscal control 
 
 
 
constitutional reform 
the extent to which regional representatives co-
determine national legislation. 
 
the extent to which a regional government  co-
determines national policy in intergovernmental 
meetings. 
 
the extent to which regional representatives co-
determine the distribution of national tax 
revenues. 
 
the extent to which regional representatives co-
determine constitutional change. 
0-2 
 
 
0-2 
 
 
 
0-2 
 
 
0-3 
Source: adapted from (Hooghe, Marks et al. 2008)
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Table 4 – Institutional depth coding scheme 
Source: adapted from (Hooghe, Marks et al. 2008) 
 
 
Institutional depth 
0: no functioning general-purpose administration at the regional level: 
1: a deconcentrated, general purpose, administration;  
2: a non-deconcentrated general purpose, administration subject to central government veto; 
3: a non-deconcentrated general purpose, administration not subject to central government veto; 
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Table 5 - General forms of state spatial rescaling and related concepts. Source: author’s research. 
 
  Federalism Federal political system Federation Regionalisation Denationalisation Destatisation Internationalisation 
Definition 
As normative principle. 
Set of arguments in 
favour of multi-tiered 
government aiming at 
combining unity and 
diversity by the 
perpetuation of both 
union and non-
centralization at the 
same time. 
 
As positive terms. 
Political organization in 
which the activities of 
government are divided 
between regional 
governments and a 
central government in 
such a way that each 
kind of government has 
some activities on 
which it makes final 
decision 
Genus of political 
systems characterised by 
the existence of two (or 
more) levels of 
government which 
combine elements of 
shared rule  through 
common institutions and 
regional self-rule for the 
governments of the 
constituent units 
Constitutional 
setting in which 
neither the federal 
nor the constituent 
units of government 
- directly elected -  
are subordinate to 
the other in the 
exercise of 
legislative, 
executive and taxing 
powers 
As self-rule.  Rising  
autonomy and scope 
of regional  
government 
decision making 
with respect to 
central government.  
 
As shared rule.  
Rising capacity of a 
regional 
government to 
shape central 
decision making. 
Hollowing out of the 
national state 
apparatus with old 
and new state 
capacities being 
reorganized 
territorially and 
functionally on 
subnational, national, 
supra-national, and 
trans-local levels  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Generalised erosion 
of the central role 
of the state as 
political 
institutionalised 
actor in favour to 
partnership 
between 
governmental, 
para-governmental 
and non-
governmental 
actors 
 
general government 
revenues relative to 
GDP;  
general government 
consumption 
relative to GDP. 
Extension of the 
international context of 
domestic state to include 
a widening range of 
extra-territorial or 
transnational factors and 
processes. 
Measurement  
 
 
 
 
Dummy variables 
Self-rule and shared 
rule are 
operationalised 
along dimensions 
each and translated 
into numerical 
values according to 
a codification 
scheme. 
 
  
 
general government 
revenues relative to 
GDP; 
general government 
consumption 
relative to GDP. 
 
 
Main 
references 
 
 
King (1982);  Watts (1996);  Elazar (1987, 1994, 1995); Burgess and 
Gagnon (1993);  Riker (1975);  Blume and Voigt (2008), Kearney (1999); 
Watts (1999); Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1999) 
Marks et al (2008) 
(Jessop 2002; Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev 2009)  
